Abstract-In the study of stochastic dynamic team problems, analytical methods for finding optimal policies are often inapplicable due to lack of prior knowledge of the cost function or the state dynamics. Reinforcement learning offers a possible solution to such coordination problems. Existing learning methods for coordinating play either rely on control sharing among controllers or otherwise, in general, do not guarantee convergence to optimal policies. In a recent paper, we provided a decentralized algorithm for finding equilibrium policies in weakly acyclic stochastic dynamic games, which contain team games as an important special case. However, stochastic dynamic teams can in general possess suboptimal equilibrium policies whose cost can be arbitrarily higher than a team optimal policy's cost. In this paper, we present a reinforcement learning algorithm and its refinements, and provide probabilistic guarantees for convergence to globally optimal policies in team games as well as a more general class of coordination games. The algorithms presented here are strictly decentralized in that they require only access to local information such as cost realizations, previous local actions, and state transitions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stochastic dynamic games are a significant generalization of both Markov decision processes (MDPs) and of repeated games, and provide a framework for studying cooperative decision making in a complex environment. Of particular interest are stochastic dynamic team games, in which all players incur the same stage costs, and coordination games in which there exist globally optimal joint policies. In finite state-action stochastic dynamic team games, at least one team optimal policy (that is, a joint policy that achieves the lowest expected discounted cost for every initial state) is guaranteed to exist. Despite the incentive to coordinate, the problem of finding and playing a team optimal policy is highly nontrivial due to incomplete information and decentralization. In this paper, we present a family of learning algorithms for team games and coordination games, and prove that these algorithms asymptotically achieve coordination on optimal policies. Furthermore, our algorithms are appropriate for decentralized control, in that they do not require control sharing among agents and require limited knowledge of the system before play.
When critical information about the other players, the cost function, or the transition probabilities is unavailable, standard tools used in classical stochastic control for recovering an optimal policy (e.g. dynamic programming, linear programming, and convex analytic methods) cannot be applied. Successful
This research was supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada. The authors are with the Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Queen's University, Kingston, ON, Canada, Email: {1bmy,yuksel@queensu.ca} coordination on optimal policies requires identifying which policies are optimal, and in the event that there are multiple optimal joint policies, there is the further issue of selecting the one that will serve as the target for coordination. One viable alternative to analytical methods is to use learning algorithms, in which controllers simultaneously take actions and attempt to learn which policies are optimal.
A number of successful learning algorithms have been developed for single-agent environments such as Markov decision processes. Methods such as Q-learning [19] asymptotically learn optimal policies in spite of incomplete information. For the twin reasons that firstly multi-agent environments are ubiquitous in applications [9] and secondly that analytical approaches are not possible under incomplete information, there has been considerable interest in the study of reinforcement learning in games. The analysis of learning in games is much more difficult than that of single-agent learning: the presence of multiple decision-making agents, each actively learning and modifying their behaviour, results in a non-stationary environment, hence the convergence results from the singleagent literature at not guaranteed. In addition to the more complex, non-stationary environment an agent faces, there are also strategic considerations related to action selection. For discussion on the problem of teaching while learning, see [14] and the references therein.
Early works attempting to generalize modern reinforcement learning methods to multi-agent settings were experimental in nature: [16] studied Q-learning in a predator-prey game, [13] considered Q-learning as applied to specific block pushing task, and [3] considered both standard Q-learning and a modified joint action learner in repeated team games. Though conjectures were presented about the convergence of their methods, these early papers lacked rigorous results.
A number of rigorous results followed shortly after the experimental work, focusing primarily on zero-sum games and team games. [8] and its successor [7] developed the Nash Q-learning algorithm, in which each player maintains jointaction Q-factors for itself and for every other player, and computes Nash equilibrium at each step. Under uniqueness conditions, Nash Q finds equilibrium policies. Friend-or-Foe Q-learning (FFQ) is presented in [10] . FFQ is computationally inexpensive compared to Nash Q, and offers guarantees under weaker conditions, but requires common access both to the controls of all players as well as understanding of whether each other player is a 'friend' or 'foe'. [18] presents an algorithm for playing a stochastic game and proves that it converges to a team optimal equilibrium in any stochastic team game. More recently, [21] present an actor-critic algorithm for use in multiagent settings with some rigorous guarantees. The results of both [18] and [21] rely on common access to the past actions of all agents.
While these publications succeeded in finding optimal policies in spite of incomplete information, the methods they use require control sharing. That is, the actions taken by one player are required to be communicated to or observed by other players. In many interesting applications, for instance when controllers are in different physical locations and do not have communication channels between them, control sharing is either impossible or severely restricted. In such settings, the already difficult issue of multi-agent learning is further complicated. On the one hand, the evaluation of joint policies is complicated since individual agents cannot refer to the actions of the remaining agents, and on the other hand the set of all joint policies might not be effectively searched.
Another practical objection to the use of control sharing is that the number of joint actions grows exponentially in the number of players. If each player is required to keep a table of Q-factors for every state and joint action pair, the problem quickly becomes intractable. In contrast, while it lacks theoretical guarantees, direct application of standard Qlearning (without reference to joint actions) is sensible for at least this computational reason. Moreover, if players are oblivious to the existence of other players, then individual Q-learning is justifiable also from an individual rationality point of view, since the players may believe they are facing a Markov decision process.
In light of these considerations among others, there has been a steady interest in learning algorithms that allow for greater decentralization but still come with rigorous guarantees. [12] presents an algorithm for playing repeated games with guarantees for maximizing the sum of payoffs across agents. [11] provides three algorithms with provably desirable convergence properties for use in repeated games. The methods presented there require no control sharing, and rely instead on using the history of cost realizations to set an aspiration level that will be used to determine whether the current action choice is satisfactory. In the same vein, [2] provides an aspiration learning algorithm for playing a repeated coordination game. This method too does not use control sharing and has desirable convergence properties, but was designed for the relatively narrow class of repeated games rather than for stochastic games. Since the state does not change in repeated games, there are no long run considerations to account for when selecting actions, which allows the player to focus on the cost realizations alone when setting the aspiration levels. In contrast, stochastic games do have state transitions that impact the long run cost of a policy, hence cost "readings" are noisy and algorithm dependent, and the setting of the aspiration levels must account for that.
In [1] , we introduced Decentralized Q-learning, a two timescale modification of Q-learning that provably finds meaningful Q-factors and leads to equilibrium in any weakly acyclic stochastic game, and in particular in any stochastic team game. The algorithm presented in [1] is decentralized in the sense that agents use only local information and do not share controls. However, the generality of this result comes at a cost: in stochastic team games, there are in general both team optimal equilibrium policies and suboptimal equilibrium policies, and the suboptimal equilibrium can perform arbitrarily worse than the optimal equilibrium. (A simple but illustrative example is offered in Section II). Consequently, guarantees of finding an equilibrium joint policy are not satisfactory in the context of decentralized control when cost minimization is a design goal.
In this paper, we present a decentralized learning algorithm and its refinements for playing stochastic coordination games, a class of games which model decentralized control problems and contain stochastic team games as a special case. We give formal guarantees of convergence to globally optimal policies. As observed above, prior work was either experimental with no rigorous results, or when rigorous required too much information sharing (in particular, control sharing). More recently, attempts to decentralize have found some success in the stochastic game setting, but have so far only guaranteed person-by-person optimality, while we guarantee global optimality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section II, we specify the model of finite stochastic team games, give the problem statement, and provide the relevant background. In section III, we present our main algorithm and state a convergence result for stochastic teams, then extend the result to the broader setting of stochastic coordination games. Section IV relates the algorithm developed here in the team setting back to the more general setting of weakly acyclic games, and strengthens a result from [1] . Section V presents refinements of the main algorithm. These refinements leverage additional information that may be available a priori, and come with more powerful convergence results. Section VI contains numerical results from a simulation study, and the final section concludes. The proofs of our claims are contained in the appendices.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. Markov Decision Processes and Q-Learning
A (discounted) Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a discrete time process characterized by the following: 1) A finite set of states X 2) A random initial state x 0 ∈ X 3) A finite set of control actions U 4) A discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) 5) A cost function c : X × U → R 6) A Markov transition kernel P [·|x, u] for determining the next state given the current state-action pair At time t ∈ Z ≥0 , the system is in state x t ∈ X and the agent must select a control action u t ∈ U. The agent then incurs a stage cost c t (x t , u t ), and the system randomly transitions to the next state, x t+1 according to the probability distribution P [·|x t , u t ]. We assume that at time t = 0, the agent observes the state x 0 , and for times t ≥ 1, the agent has access to the following information:
A policy is a rule for selecting control actions based on the history of observations. In principle, the agent can use any type of policy, provided their action selection is a (possibly random) function of their observations. However, we will focus on the set of stationary Markov policies, denoted ∆ := {γ : X → P(U)}, where P(U) is the set of probability distributions on U. A policy γ induces a probability measure on the sequence of states and actions, which in turn allows us to define the relevant cost criterion:
The agent is interested in finding a policy γ * ∈ ∆ such that J x (γ * ) = inf γ∈∆ J x (γ) for every initial state x ∈ X. It is well-known (see, for example, [6] ) that there exists a stationary deterministic policy π * : X → U that achieves this infimum. We will denote the set of all stationary and deterministic policies by Π := {π : X → U}. It is immediate that Π ⊂ ∆, and also that |Π|∈ N while ∆ is uncountable.
When the cost function and transition kernel is known, iterative methods such as value iteration can be used to recover an optimal policy. When the system's model is not known, model-free reinforcement learning techniques such as Q-learning [19] can be used to recover an optimal policy.
In standard Q-learning, the agent begins with an arbitrary vector of Q-factors Q 0 ∈ R X×U , and interacts with the system and updates the vector as feedback is received, according to the update rule
where a t (x, u) is a step-size parameter. The algorithm is well-studied in the context of MDPs, and has been shown that if all state-action pairs are visited infinitely often and if the step-sizes are square summable but not summable almost surely, then Q t → Q * , where Q * is the fixed point of a Bellman-like update. See [20] , [17] for details.
Once Q * is attained, one can recover the value function V * : X → R by taking V * (x) = min u∈U Q * (x, u), or one can recover an optimal policy π * by setting π * (x) = argmin u∈U Q * (x, u). Moreover, learned Q-factors can be exploited during play: [15] presents a method for playing a MDP in which the agent's action selection converges to that of an optimal policy.
The popularity of Q-learning in MDPs is justified: it is easy to implement, and comes with theoretical guarantees for asymptotically recovering optimal policies. However, it should be emphasized that these theoretical guarantees are predicated on stationarity of the system: when the agent visits a state-action pair, the feedback received-which comes in the form of the cost realization and the state transition-is always generated by the same Markovian source. If the system being controlled was not an MDP, then the theoretical guarantees do not apply. In particular, if multiple decision making agents are present and each agent is actively learning and modifying their policy, there is no immediate reason to believe individual Q-learning as presented should converge and be useful for recovering an optimal policy.
B. Stochastic Games and Decentralized Q-Learning
A finite stochastic game is a multi-agent generalization of a MDP, and is characterized by the following: 1) N ∈ N decision making agents, the i th denoted DM i 2) A finite set of states X 3) A random initial state x 0 ∈ X 4) For each DM i :
A finite set of control actions
for determining the next state given the current state and current joint action
At time t ∈ Z ≥0 , the system is in state x t , and each DM 
i cannot see the past joint actions u j s for j = i and s ∈ N. This is in contrast to previous works such as [18] , [7] , [10] and [21] .
In analogy to MDPs, the goal for DM i is to minimize the expectation of their discounted series of costs. Unlike the MDP setting, DM i 's costs are also affected by the control actions of the other decision makers. Policies are defined as before, and as before we will focus on stationary Markov polices. For DM i , the set of stationary Markov policies is denoted ∆ i := {γ i : X → P(U i )}, and the set of deterministic stationary policies is denoted
To refer to joint actions and joint policies, we denote the set of joint stationary Markov policies by ∆ := × N i=1 ∆ i , the set of joint stationary and deterministic policies by Π := × N i=1 Π i , and the set of joint actions is denoted by
We use the notational convention u −i to refer to the joint action of all agents except for i. That is,
, and we write u = (u i , u −i ). Similar shorthand will be used for policies.
A joint policy γ ∈ ∆ induces a probability measure on the sequence of states and joint actions, which we use in defining DM i 's cost criterion:
where u k ∈ U is the (random variable) joint action selected by the joint policy γ = (γ i , γ −i ) at time k. Then, DM i 's goal is to select a policy to minimize this cost. 
Every stochastic game has at least one equilibrium joint policy [5] . Since γ −i ∈ ∆ −i is stationary Markov, the environment that DM i faces is equivalent to a MDP. Hence, for any γ −i ∈ ∆ −i , there is always a stationary deterministic best response for player i. We denote this set of best responses by
Moreover, we can describe the set BR 
where the expectation is taken with respect to the joint distribution of u −i determined by γ −i (x), and where s(x) denotes the state that follows x after (u i , u −i ) is played. Then, BR i γ −i can be expressed as
Despite the existence of stationary deterministic best responses, the existence of a stationary deterministic equilibrium policy is not guaranteed in general. (When randomization is allowed, existence is guaranteed.) Repeated zero-sum games, such as matching pennies and rock-paper-scissors, offer simple examples of games without stationary and deterministic policies. However, when restricting to the class of games we are interested in, which model cooperative systems, we are guaranteed the existence of stationary and deterministic equilibrium policies. 
Given a stochastic team game and supposing that the system was centralized, we can study an associated MDP with action set U = × N i=1 U i . Any joint policy in the stochastic team game is an admissible policy in the reduction (though the converse is not always true), so the minimum cost for a state in the reduction is no greater than the minimum cost achievable in the stochastic team game. Then, since the reduction is a MDP, there exists a stationary and deterministic optimal policy π * ∈ Π = {π :
We note that π * is an admissible joint policy in the corresponding team problem. By the previous observation that the reduction's optimal costs lower bound the achievable costs in stochastic team game, we have that π * is team optimal. Thus, in a stochastic team game, the set of stationary and deterministic team optimal policies Π OP T = {π ∈ Π : π is team optimal } is always non-empty. Our objective as algorithms designers is the following: given a finite discounted stochastic team game without control sharing, we wish to provide the players with a learning algorithm for playing the game that provably converges to a team optimal policy. In [1] , we presented Decentralized Q-learning and proved convergence to equilibrium policies almost surely in the larger class of weakly acyclic games. The algorithm instructs a player to use the same stationary policycalled a baseline policy-for a large number of consecutive stage games-the collection of which is called an exploration phase. At the end of an exploration phase (and never during one), players are allowed to update their baseline policies in a synchronized manner. In this way, the system is stationary for long enough for Q-learning to return meaningful Q-factors. The Q-factors acquired during an exploration phase can be used to construct a best response policy and the update process will eventually lead to players using baseline policies that form an equilibrium. 1 . After this is achieved, players will have no incentive to change their policies, and so play will settle.
It is immediate that if π * ∈ Π OP T , then π * is an equilibrium joint policy. The converse is emphatically not true. One can construct stochastic team games for which suboptimal equilibrium joint policies exists. For an illustration of how poorly suboptimal equilibrium policies can perform, consider the repeated team game presented in Table I . Here, α > 1, |X|= 1, and the state dynamics are trivial. It is apparent that the joint policy of playing Up and Left in each period, denoted π sub , is an equilibrium joint policy, as is the joint policy of playing Down and Right in each period, denoted π * . We have that
, can be made arbitrarily large. Indeed, if α > 3, even the joint policy of independently selecting actions uniformly at random outperforms π sub . Consequently, the Decentralized Q-learning algorithm-which is guaranteed to find one of π * or π subdoes not achieve the design goal outlined above.
In the next section, we present a learning algorithm for playing stochastic team games. These algorithms build on the exploration phase technique from [1] , but also exploit the following structural result on Q-factors in team games:
Proof. Let V * be the value function for the corresponding reduction MDP for which the set of control actions if
be the value function for the MDP faced by DM i when the remaining players follow γ −i . We have that
and
From this, we can see that
That is,π is team optimal. This contradicts our choice ofπ, hence there must be some state x for which
, which completes the proof.
This fact provides for us an avenue for separating optimal policies from suboptimal ones by focusing on Q-factors.
III. NEW ALGORITHMS To motivate our algorithm, let us first consider a stochastic process on the set of joint policies Π that is induced by players updating their policies according to the following (unrealistic) procedure:
Idealized Update Procedure for DM 
Denote the transition matrix of the induced time homogenous Markov chain on Π by A f,h,γ , and denote its unique invariant measure by
Moreover, for any initial probability measure µ 0 on Π, we have
Proof. For notational ease, we proceed with µ * = µ * f,h,γ and A γ = A f,h,γ . All players' following this procedure induces a time homogenous Markov chain on Π. For fixed
we have that the chain is irreducible, hence there exists unique µ * such that µ * = µ * A γ . We use this to lower bound µ * (Π OP T ) = π∈Π OP T µ * (π) as follows:
, and
Hence, there exists some δ > 0 such that |γ|< δ implies F (γ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. From this, the result follows immediately.
If our goal as algorithm designers is to ensure that the probability of players using team optimal policies is sufficiently high, the limiting behaviour of this idealized update process is desirable. However, this procedure clearly cannot be implemented: due to incomplete information about the game, Π OP T is unknown, and since players are not sharing controls, π −i k is not observed by DM i . Nevertheless, this motivates our algorithm, which is presented below.
Algorithm 1 (for
i > 0 a tolerance for suboptimality when constructing best-response sets • d i > 0, a tolerance for sub-optimality when setting the aspiration level
• γ i ∈ (0, 1), the probability of randomly updating baseline policy when aspiration level is satisfied • W ∈ N, a window size for constructing the aspiration levels. Common to all DM i .
= the number of visits to (x t , u i t ) in the k th exploration phase (up to and including t)
End k th exploration phase. (Go to exploration phase k + 1) Assumption 1. For any states x, x ′ ∈ X, there exists H ∈ N and joint actionsũ 0 , . . . ,ũ H such that
Assumption 1 is common to reinforcement learning methods. If it does not hold, then there exist transient states that will be visited a number of times and then never revisited. The play in these states affects the long run discounted cost, but there will be no opportunity for subsequent experimentation, and even cleverly designed learning algorithms will fail to reliably find optimal policies in such settings. 
Assumption 3. For each player i, we have (a) there exists
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix.
The preceding algorithm was designed for stochastic team games, where c i = c j and β i = β j for all players i, j. However, the convergence result can be easily extended to a wider class of games that model cooperative systems. We may call the set Π * the set of coordination policies. This definition is similar to what [2] calls a strict coordination game that satisfies hypothesis (H2), but is more general: firstly, it is applicable to stochastic games, and secondly it drops the requirement that all π ∈ Π\ (Π * ∪Π EQ ) are Pareto inefficient. In Appendix D, we present a comparison of Theorem 2 to the main result of [2] .
Using Lemma 1, it is immediate that a stochastic team game is a coordination game. Consider the cost minimization repeated game presented in Table II for an example of a coordination game that is not a team game. Here, Π * = (Down, Right). There exists
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in the appendix.
As is common in aspiration learning methods (see, e.g. [2] ), Algorithm 1 largely relies on the principle of "win-stay, lose-shift." However, for reasons discussed below, we prescribe additional randomness during the policy update, with greater randomness when the current policy does not attain the aspiration level. This randomness ensures the effective search of the set of joint policies, prevents becoming stuck prematurely in suboptimal equilibrium joint policies, and facilitates analysis.
Algorithm 1 mimics the Idealized Update Procedure (IUP). The 'If' suite of IUP is replaced with a proxy for the question π k ∈ Π OP T : using experience up to time k, DM i will set an aspiration level Λ
Unlike previous aspiration learning methods such as [2] , which largely focus on the repeated game setting, our algorithms are designed for stochastic team games. Due to the more complicated long run cost considerations in stochastic games, the issue of setting an aspiration level is harder than in the repeated game case, in which cost realizations can be used directly without reference to state transitions. Thus, absent major modifications, the prior methods cannot be used in stochastic games. In light of Lemma 1, a viable alternative is to use Q-factors to construct an aspiration level that separates optimal joint policies from suboptimal policies.
Relying on Q-factors to construct aspiration levels presents other problems. The first challenge is that the convergence of Q-factors is only asymptotic, and the learning process must be stopped at a finite time in order to update policies. Hence the obtained Q-factors will be random variables. This can be mitigated by allowing a longer exploration phase length. The second challenge is that if other players experiment and change policies erratically, the stationarity of the environment may be compromised and Q-learning may not converge even asymptotically. The two-timescale approach in [1] combined with low experimentation probabilities ρ i handles this issue. The noise in the obtained Q-factors is the primary reason we opt to use long but finite memory for setting the aspiration level: we wish to discard unattainably good performances from memory. This finite memory is in turn one of the reasons for which we have introduced randomness into the policy update portion: to avoid the situation in which play has settled into a suboptimal equilibrium policy, and the aspiration level for each player is according to the suboptimal equilibrium rather than according to a team optimal policy.
IV. APPLICATION TO WEAKLY ACYCLIC GAMES
In this section we present a specific variant of Algorithm 1 with desirable convergence properties in weakly acyclic games. All team games are weakly acyclic games, though not all coordination games (as defined in Section III) are weakly acyclic-the repeated game presented in Table II , for example, is not weakly acyclic. In [1] , it was shown that for any ǫ > 0, P (π n ∈ Π EQ ) ≥ 1 − ǫ could be achieved for n sufficiently large. However, if the weakly acyclic game being played was also a team game (or a coordination game), no optimality guarantees were provided. We now strengthen that result.
Algorithm 2 (for
• A sequence of positive integers {T k } k≥0 , the exploration phase lengths.
-Define t 0 = 0, and in general t k+1 = t k + T k .
• ρ i ∈ (0, 1) an experimentation probability • λ i ∈ (0, 1) the probability of inertia 
Moreover, if the game is also a coordination game, then we can replace Π
EQ by Π * and the inequality above holds.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 is in the appendix.
V. REFINEMENTS WHEN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE
We return now to the team problem. Algorithm 1 was designed so that the aspiration level can be estimated during the course of play. In some cases, the aspiration level will be available a priori. If such information is available, stronger convergence results can be proved. In this section, we present two such algorithms. Let us define two quantities necessary for selecting an appropriate aspiration level:
Algorithm 3 (for DM i ) (Learning with Aspiration Threshold)
Set Parameters
• ρ i ∈ (0, 1) an experimentation probability • λ i ∈ (0, 1) the probability of inertia • δ i > 0 a tolerance for suboptimality when constructing best-response sets • Λ ∈ R, a threshold value for comparing to total cost • {α i n } n≥0 a sequence of step sizes such that α
• γ i ∈ (0, 1), probability for randomly updating baseline policy 
End k th exploration phase. (and continue to exploration phase k + 1)
Theorem 4. Consider a stochastic team game in which all players employ Algorithm 3, and for which Assumption 1 holds. Let Λ ∈ (OP T, N EXT ).
Then there existsδ > 0,ρ > 0 such that if δ i ∈ (0,δ) and ρ i ∈ (0,ρ) for every i, and
Proof. See appendix
Next, we present an algorithm with ρ i = 0 for each i. That is, agents will not do any experimenting during the course of an exploration phase. Though we previously required ρ i > 0, this modification is easily handled.
Algorithm 4 (for DM i ) (Learning with Aspiration Threshold)
• Λ ∈ R, a threshold value for comparing to total cost • {α i n } n≥0 a sequence of step sizes such that α
Theorem 5. Consider a stochastic team game in which all players employ Algorithm 4, and for which Assumption 1 holds. If Λ ∈ (OP T, N EXT ), and lim
The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in the appendix. In contrast to the statements the previous theorems, Theorem 5 does not have any parameter restrictions that depend on the game being played. In comparison with the previous algorithms, it is extremely simple and gives a powerful result, all predicated only on the condition that Λ ∈ (OP T, N EXT ) is available at the outset of play. Despite being a restrictive condition in general, it leads to a very desirable result. Since players do not experiment with non-policy actions, the results of Theorem 5 are stronger than those of Theorem 4: as the baseline policy converges, we also have convergence on the level of stage games.
VI. A SIMULATION STUDY:
A TWO STATE COORDINATION GAME We consider the following two player stochastic team game with U 1 = U 2 = X = {1, 2}. Decision makers wish to minimize the expectation of their series of discounted costs, but are unaware of the specifics of the game being played. The stage games for states 1 and 2 have the following costs: State 1 is a low cost state and State 2 is a high cost state. The transition probabilities, given below, are constructed so that when players successfully coordinate their actions (on an action that is state-dependent) the system will transition with high probability to the low cost state. Otherwise, the system will transition with high probability to the low cost state.
In particular, when in State 2, players are faced with the choice between on the one hand incurring a lower short term cost (+10) and likely remaining in the high cost state and on the other hand paying a higher short term cost (+13) with the hopes of transitioning to the low cost state and avoiding sustained high costs.
For sufficiently large discount factors, the unique team optimal joint policy is for both players to play action 1 when in state 1 and for both players to play action 2 when in state 2. However, there are three suboptimal equilibrium policies, namely (i) both players always play 1; (ii) both players always play 2, (iii) both players always choose the action with label opposite the label of the current state.
Using a discount factor of β = 0.8, we ran simulations of four Algorithms. Algorithms A and B were in the form of Algorithm 1 and used a finite memory of previous scores to construct an aspiration level, while C and D used an aspiration level that was provided a priori. In every algorithm, when facing
i was instructed to update uniformly at random with probability γ 1 (common for both agents), and when facing
i was instructed to update uniformly at random with probability γ 1 + γ 2 (common to both agents). When not updating uniformly at random (with In each case the empirical results confirmed the theoretical results above. The results are summarized below. The algorithms performed generally as we expected. The disparity across algorithms owes largely to the parameter selection: in the simulations of Algorithm B, we chose γ 2 = 1 − γ 1 , which lead to quickly shifting away from policies that were judged to be suboptimal. In contrast, we chose γ 2 = 0.2 for the simulations of algorithms C and D, and for the simulation of Algorithm A we chose γ 2 = 0.1. Furthermore, we length of the exploration phases varied (from 10,000 plays for Algorithm A, 7,500 for Algorithms C and D, and only 5,000 for Algorithm B), and the aspiration value used for algorithms C and D was chosen without extensive tuning. The window length W = 30 in Algorithm A, while W = 50 for Algorithm B. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we presented a learning algorithm for playing stochastic coordination games, and provided rigorous results on the convergence of baseline policies to team optimal or coordination policies. While previous studies have focused on the relatively narrow class of repeated games rather than the broader class of stochastic games, or otherwise used a large degree of control sharing among players to achieve their convergence results, we have provided a method for achieving coordination without any control sharing during play and with limited prior information about the game.
The proof methods used in this paper differ substantially from those used in our previous work [1] . Here, our analysis centres on using Markov chains to approximate the true process, and are more similar to the methods used in [2] . The algorithms presented are amenable to further variants and can be modified as needed, and the Markov chain analysis used for the convergence guarantees can likewise be easily modified.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2 This appendix contains the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. Since team games are a special case of coordination games with Π * = Π OP T , the proof of Theorem 1 follows from the proof of Theorem 2, so we present the proofs in reverse order.
We will make use of the following lemma. Recall (see [4] ) the definition of the Dobrushin coefficient of an n × n matrix P : δ(P ) := min{ n j=1 min{P (i, j), P (k, j)} : i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. If µ 0 is any initial probability distribution on X and {M k } k∈N is a sequence of right stochastic matrices on X satisfying
for all k ≥ 0 and x, y ∈ X, where τ < min{
Proof. First, we recall a useful inequality involving the Dobrushin coefficient (see, e.g. [4] ): for any probability distributions ν, µ on X, we have νR − µR 1 ≤ (1 − δ(R)) ν − µ 1 . If δ(R) > 0, then R is a contraction, since δ(R) ≤ 1 is guaranteed by R's being a transition matrix. By the Banach fixed point theorem, there exists a unique invariant measure µ * = µ * R, and furthermore for any initial distribution µ 0 , we have lim k→∞ µ 0 R k = µ * . By assumption, |R(a, b)−M k (a, b)|< τ for every a, b ∈ X and every k ≥ 0. As a consequence, we have |δ(R)−δ(M k )|≤ nτ . Then, our choice of τ < δ(R)
For each k ≥ 0, let us write E k := M k − R, and note that the matrix E k satisfies 0 ≤ |E k (a, b)|< τ for every a, b ∈ X.
By induction on k and using
Note that the term nτ
for every k. Then, since ρ ∈ (0, 1), we have lim k→∞ ρ k µ 0 − µ * 1 = 0 for any µ 0 . Thus, for sufficiently large k, we have
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 Let ǫ > 0 be given. The theorem statement is trivial for ǫ ≥ 1, so we proceed with ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
For a coordination game, consider the Idealized Update Procedure introduced in Section III, replacing Π OP T by Π * . Suppose players use the fixed maps
Proof Program
For k ∈ N and π, π ′ ∈ Π, we define
The matrices C k are right stochastic matrices, so if we can ensure that |C k (π, π ′ ) − A f,γ (π, π ′ )|< τ for every π, π ′ ∈ Π and for all but finitely many exploration phases k, where
then the result follows Lemma 3 immediately due to our selection of τ, γ 1 , . . . , γ N :
So, we will argue that appropriately selected parameters guarantees that
for every π, π ′ ∈ Π and for all but finitely many exploration phases k.
In order to achieve (1), we define an event R k such that for all π, π ′ ∈ Π, k ≥ 0, we have
Then we argue that parameter selection can ensure P r(R k |π k = π) ≥ 1 − τ for all but finitely many k.
Proof Details
For notational clarity, let us define
. Next, we define some objects necessary for our parameter restrictions:
δ is the minimum non-zero distance between Q-factors. It will be used for constructing best-response sets. Convergence of Q-factors to within 
and time k. Second, chooseρ 2 > 0 that satisfies the following:
for each player i and time k. Since the exploration phase portion of Algorithm 1 is identical to the exploration phase portion of Algorithm A presented in [1] , and since Assumption 1 holds, we can invoke [1, Lemma 3] to conclude that suchρ 1 ,ρ 2 > 0 exist. Now we defineρ := min{ρ 1 ,ρ 2 }.
For B ∈ Z, let B(B) := {B · W, B · W + 1, . . . , (B + 1)W − 1}. For any j, B ≥ 0, we define the following events:
For k ∈ N : k ≥ W , we have that k ∈ B(B + 1) for some B ≥ 0. In this case,
Moreover, conditional on F k also occurring, we have that the best-response set of each player is recovered without error. That is, P (BR
We now invoke Lemma 2 from [1, Appendix B]: there exists L ∈ N such that if T j ≥ L for every j ∈ N, we have
With all of the preceding parameter restrictions in place, we claim that if T j ≥ L for every j ∈ N, then
By our choice ofρ ≤ρ 2 and the restriction ρ i ∈ (0,ρ), we have that
for every player i and time j. Then, since Ξ ≤ d * 4|X| , applying the triangle inequality and summing over x ∈ X gives us the following for all j ≥ 0:
In particular, this implies
Similarly, sinceρ ≤ρ 1 and Ξ ≤ 1 4 min i {δ i ,δ − δ i }, we have by the triangle inequality that
. Since players update their policies independently, and DM i considers any policy with probability no less than
Comparison to a binomial random variable with W i.i.d. trials and probability of success
where the second inequality holds by our choice of W . All together, the preceding implies that
Then, since
Using the law of total probability on
, we see that
We invoke Lemma 3 in the manner outlined at the beginning of the proof, and the result follows.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 A finite, discounted stochastic team game is a coordination game with coordination set Π * = Π OP T . Hence the result follows from the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 3 We begin with a lemma that will be used in the sequel. We use the matrix norm given by M ∞ := max i,j |M i,j |. We denote the n × n identity matrix by I n Lemma 4. Consider a time homogernous Markov chain {X t } t≥0 that takes values in the finite set X, with transition matrix D and initial distribution. Suppose that for some set A ⊂ X, there exists δ > 0 and H ∈ N such that:
Let ǫ > 0 be given. Then, there exists ξ > 0 such that for any sequence of right stochastic matrices
for any initial probability distribution µ on X.
Proof. Let ǫ > 0 be given. It is clear from hypotheses (i), (ii) that for any µ, we have that lim n→∞ µD n (A) = 1. In particular, it is true for the point mass at x ∈ X, µ = δ x , for any x ∈ X. Since a general probability vector µ on X can be expressed as a convex combination of the (finitely many) point masses, µ = x∈X µ(x)δ x , we choose N ∈ N such that δ x D k (A) > 1 − ǫ/2 for every x ∈ X and k ≥ N . By linearity, such N then also satisfies µD N (A) > 1 − ǫ/2 for arbitrary probability vector µ on X.
Suppose that a sequence of right stochastic matrices
In general, using the conventions that D 0 := I |X| , and M j+1 · · · M n := I |X| whenever j + 1 > n , we have that
This claim can be argued by induction, and is omitted. We note that if v is a 1 × |X| row vector and B is a |X|×|X| matrix, we have that
From this, we see that for any n ∈ N, we have
The final inequality can be deduced from the following two points: firstly, µD j−1 is a probability vector and E j ∞ < ξ,
is a right-stochastic matrix, i.e. it has nonnegative entries and all rows sum to one; hence, the sum of all its entries is the number of rows, |X|.
In particular, this holds for n = N , which was chosen so that µD N (A) ≥ 1 − ǫ/2 for any initial distribution µ. If we take ξ < ǫ 2|X|N , then it follows that
Together, we have
This holds for an arbitrary probability vector µ. For time index n ≥ N , we can write
is again a probability vector on X, hence the same argument applies and we again see that
Recall best responding with inertia, as presented in [1] :
In a weakly acyclic game, the (idealized) stochastic process on Π obtained when all players use best responding with inertia (with access to their true best response sets) satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 4, with Π EQ playing the role of the distinguished set A. The transition matrix of that Markov chain is parametrized by λ = (λ i )
. Let us denote the transition matrix by D λ .
Proof of Theorem 3
Let ǫ > 0 be given. Suppose all players use Algorithm 2 to update their policies, with fixed λ i ∈ (0, 1) for each i. Denote by D λ the transition matrix for the corresponding Best Responding with Inertia process. By Lemma 4, there exists ξ such that C k − D λ ∞ < ξ for all but finitely many k implies 
is a convex combination of the uniform distribution and some other probability distribution (henceK i ≥ (γ If the game at hand is a coordination game, then 1 ≤ |Π * ≤ |Π|, and so our choice ofγ and γ
f,hγ is the invariant measure of A f,h,γ , the transition matrix for the Markov chain induced by all players' using the Idealized Update Procedure outlined in Section III.) If the game is not a coordination game, then nothing is gained or lost by the following restriction: for every i, fix γ
Next, we define the following objects, using the shorthand
If the game is weakly acyclic but not a coordination game, then we do not wish to assign any special significance to these quantities. On the other hand, if it is a coordination game, then these quantities are analogous to those defined in the proof of Theorem 2.
We now repeat parts of the proof of Theorem 2: defininḡ δ as in Appendix A, Assumption 2 requires d i ∈ (0,d) and
Note: since weakly acyclic games are in general not coordination games, unqualified references to the Idealized Update Process outlined in Section III and to the corresponding matrix A f,h,γ are spurious. However, if the game is indeed a coordination game, this choice of τ lower bounds the Dobrushin coefficient δ(A f,h,γ ):
. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 2,
These parameter restrictions are sufficient to achieve our result. Define N k to be the event in which no players randomize at the end of exploration phase k. i.e., when N k holds, all players use best responding with inertia to update their baseline policies. Define
. Given our parameter restrictions, A k guarantees all players have correctly recovered their true best response sets.. Then, we have for every π, π
Next, we notice the following implication: if P (N k ∩ A k |π k = π) ≥ 1−ξ, then C k −D λ ∞ < ξ, which allows us to invoke Lemma 4 and conclude that lim inf n P (π n ∈ Π EQ ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Next, we will prove that
Since the random variables determining when DM i updates randomly are independent of π k (and independent across players and time) by assumption, we have On the other hand, since
Invoking Lemma 4 achieves lim inf n P (π n ∈ Π EQ ) ≥ 1 − ǫ, proving the first part of Theorem 3. Now suppose that the game is a coordination game. The parameter restrictions offered here satisfy those outlined in the proof of Theorem 2, hence we also have lim inf n P (π n ∈ Π * ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. This completes the proof. Let µ 0 be any initial distribution, and let {M k } k≥0 be a sequences of n × n right stochastic matrices with entries indexed by element of X.
Proof. This can be proved using Lemma 4 in a sequential argument.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We begin by constructing a stochastic process to be used in comparison to the actual stochastic process we wish to consider.
according to best responding with inertia:
uniformly at random, and
Increment k (End Update C) Update C induces a time homogenous Markov chain on Π, in which all players follow Update C and choose their random updates independently. In this case, the Markov chain is not irreducible: the set Π OP T is positive recurrent, and the set Π \ Π OP T is transient. Let the transition matrix associated to this Markov Chain be given by Γ γ,λ .
For OP T , N EXT as defined in Section V, let Λ ∈ (OP T, N EXT ). We recall the definition ofδ as the minimum non-zero separation between Q-factors, and impose δ i ∈ (0,δ) for each DM i .
Next, we defineρ > 0 to satisfy the following: if ρ i ∈ (0,ρ) for each i, then
holds for each DM i and time k, where Lemma 3] guarantees that such aρ > 0 exists.
For exploration phase index j ∈ N, we define
If all players are using Algorithm C and choose their updates independently, we have the following:
wherever this conditional probability is defined. This is because when conditioning on E k ∩ F k , we have the equivalence
Then, both conditionally and unconditionally, we have
We now define the probability vectors µ k and the matrices of conditional expectations C k :
Given our choice of Λ ∈ (OP T, N EXT ), the parameter restrictions δ i ∈ (0,δ), ρ i ∈ (0,ρ) for each i, and lim k→∞ T k → +∞, we can now prove that lim k→∞ C k (π, π ′ ) = Γ γ,λ (π, π ′ ), for every π, π ′ ∈ Π
Since we defined C k (π, π ′ ) := Γ γ,λ (π, π ′ ) for π with µ k (π) = 0 and argued that P (π k1 = π ′ |π k = π, E k ∩ F k ) = Γ γ,λ (π, π ′ ), it is sufficient to show that for any ξ > 0, there exists some time T ξ ∈ N such that k ≥ T ξ implies P (E k ∩ F k |π k = π) > 1 − ξ for every π ∈ Π with µ k (π) > 0.
We invoke [1, Lemma 4] to conclude that there exists T We define OP T and N EXT as above, and require that Λ ∈ (OP T, N EXT ). We define U By set containment and summing over x ∈ X, it is clear that if T k ≥ T ξ , then P (E k ) ≥ 1 − ξ. The event E k guarantees that all players are correctly assessing whether the current baseline policy is optimal or not, hence we have that P (π k+1 = π ′ |π k = π, E k ) = D γ (π, π ′ ) for any π, π ′ ∈ Π for which this conditional probability is defined.
We define
Since lim k T k = +∞, we have that lim k P (E k ) = 1. In turn, this implies that
We invoke Lemma 5, noting that Π OP T is the absorbing set, which completes the proof.
APPENDIX D: APPLICATION TO REPEATED GAMES
In this appendix, we consider Algorithm 1 when applied to repeated coordination games. Without long-run cost considerations, the body of the algorithm and the proof of convergence can be greatly simplified. As mentioned in Section III, a coordination game (as defined here) generalizes what [2] calls a strict coordination game that satisfies hypothesis (H2). We offer the game from Table II as an example of a coordination game (as defined here) that is not a coordination game as defined in [2] . This demonstrates that, even when restricted to repeated games, coordination games as presented here are a strictly larger class of games than strict coordination games satisfying (H2). We state our result in the cost minimization setting, and will use Π and U interchangeably, as they are equivalent when |X|= 1.
Algorithm 1 for Repeated Games (A1RG) (for DM
i )
Set parameters
• The functions f i , g i : U i → P(U i ) • γ i ∈ (0, 1), the probability of randomly updating when aspiration level is satisfied. Proof. Let ǫ > 0 be fixed. Then, we invoke Lemma 2 (replacing Π OP T by Π * ) to recoverγ ǫ/2 such that γ i ∈ (0,γ ǫ/2 ) for each i gives µ * f,g,γ (Π * ) ≥ 1 − ǫ/2. Since c i is minimized by exactly those u ∈ U * (equivalently, those π ∈ Π * ), we have that the sequence {Λ i k } k≥0 is non-increasing and is constant after Π * is visited for the first time. Moreover, for times k after Π * is visited for the first time, c i k ≤ Λ i k ⇐⇒ π k ∈ Π * . We thus have P r(π k+1 = π ′ |{π k = π} ∩ (∪ k j=0 {π j ∈ Π * }) = A f,g,γ (π, π ′ )
Now note that lim k→∞ P (∪ k j=0 {π j ∈ Π * }) = 1, since K i > 0 for all i. Thus |C k (π, π ′ ) − A f,g,γ (π, π ′ )|→ 0. After discarding at most finitely many indices, we invoke Lemma 3, since δ(A f,g,γ ) > 0, and conclude that µ k (Π * ) ≥ 1 − ǫ for k sufficiently large.
The preceding result is very much in the spirit of the main result in [2] . The method in [2] uses additional randomness during the aspiration level update, while the method here uses additional randomness during the policy update. [2] presents an aspiration learning method for repeated coordination games satisfying one of hypothesis (H1) or (H2), and proves that play converges to a desirable set, while we present an aspiration learning method for stochastic coordination games and prove convergence to a desirable set. When restricted to repeated games, coordination games as defined here contain the set of strict coordination games satisfying (H2), but do not contain strict coordination games satisfying (H1). Conversely, strict coordination games satisfying (H1) do not contain coordination games as defined here.
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